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UNCHARTED TERRITORY: CHOOSING AN 
EFFECTIVE APPROACH IN TRANSGENDER-




A client steps into your office to discuss an immigration matter.  The 
client, Geovanni, appears to be an effeminate gay man, but Geovanni tells 
you that she is transgender and considers herself to be female.1
 
∗ The author is the legal director of Immigration Equality, formerly known as the Lesbian 
and Gay Immigration Rights Task Force.  Immigration Equality advocates for equal rights 
for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and HIV-positive individuals under U.S. immigration 
law.  The author would like to thank legal intern Aaron Morris (anticipated juris doctorate at 
American University, 2005) for his invaluable assistance with this Article.  The author 
would also like to thank Dean Spade, founder of the Sylvia Rivera Law Project, for reading 
and commenting on portions of the Article. 
  As a result 
of her transgender identity, she has endured tremendous mistreatment in 
her country, beginning with physical and verbal abuse in school that 
escalated in frequency and violence as she got older.  Geovanni was 
harassed and forced to pay bribes to the local police on many occasions.  
Eventually, a police officer took Geovanni into custody, brought her to a 
1. Some commentators define “transgender” much more broadly than I do in this 
Article.  For example, Taylor Flynn uses the term “transgender” to include lesbians, gay 
men, bisexuals, “masculine-appearing women, effeminate men, cross-dressers, and 
intersexed (those born with ambiguous or dual anatomy) individuals.”  Taylor Flynn, 
Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for 
Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 393 n.5 and accompanying 
text (2001).  Likewise, Paisley Currah and Shannon Minter use the term “transgender” “in 
its most inclusive sense, as an umbrella term encompassing: pre-operative, post-operative 
and non-operative transsexual people; cross-dressers; feminine men and masculine women; 
intersexed persons; and more generally, anyone whose gender identity or expression differs 
from conventional expectations of masculinity or femininity.”  Paisley Currah & Shannon 
Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality 
for Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 37 n.1 (2000). 
  Other legal scholars, such as Chai R. Feldblum, have defined “transgender” more 
narrowly, as I do, to include only those “who desire to change their gender, are in the 
process of changing their gender, or have completed the process of changing their gender.” 
Chai R. Feldblum, The Pursuit of Social and Political Equality: Sexual Orientation, 
Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 238 n.1 (1996). 
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remote location, and raped her.  Based on the years of abuse she has 




This Article uses the term “transgender” identity to refer to individuals 
who feel a discord between their gender identity and their anatomical 
sexthat is, those who were born anatomically male but believe that their 
gender is female or those who were born anatomically female but believe 
that their gender is male.  Some transgender individuals take affirmative 
steps to physically change their anatomical sex, undergoing such 
procedures as hormone therapy, electrolysis, and sex reassignment 
surgery.3  This Article uses the term “transsexual” to define such 
individuals.  Many commentators have argued for a broader definition of 
“transgender,” which would include virtually any individual who does not 
conform in appearance or behavior to societal expectations for their 
gender.4  This Article will focus more narrowly, however, on individuals 
like Geovanni who believe that they were born with the wrong anatomical 
sex and who suffer persecution as a result of their transgender identity.5
This Article will discuss existing precedent in the context of transgender 





 2. The facts in this hypothetical are taken from Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 
1084 (9th Cir. 2000), discussed at length infra at Part II.B.  In discussing Geovanni’s facts, I 
refer to Geovanni as “she.”  In fact, in both the Ninth Circuit’s decision and in the amicus 
brief submitted on Geovanni’s behalf, Geovanni was described as “he.”  Id.; Brief of Amici 
Curiae ACLU of Southern California, et al. passim, Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 
1084 (No. 98-70582), available at http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndcaselaw/hernandez.pdf  
 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2005).  Thus, when I discuss the actual Hernandez-Montiel case, I use 
the masculine pronoun.  As discussed infra, this choice of gender description for Geovanni 
was probably the result of the attorney’s strategic choice to frame the claim as that of a “gay 
man with a female sexual identity” rather than as a transgender woman.  See Hernandez-
Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1087. 
 3. See Flynn, supra note 1, at 393 n.4. 
 4. See supra note 1 (offering examples of scholars who advocate broader definitions of 
the term “transgender”). 
 5. As noted supra in note 2, Geovanni’s facts are taken from the Hernandez-Montiel 
case.  225 F.3d 1084.  It is not possible, however, to determine definitively from the facts 
cited in the decision whether or not Hernandez-Montiel actually believed that he should 
have been born anatomically female.  See generally id. 
 6. Although published cases are scarce in this area of asylum law, there have been 
numerous successful asylum cases for transgender individuals.  See Fatima Mohyuddin, 
United States Asylum Law in the Context of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: Justice 
for the Transgendered?, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 387, 405-10 (2001) (discussing four 
successful transgender asylum cases).  Additionally, as legal director of Immigration 
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Generally, there are very few published decisions for successful asylum 
cases.7  Of those few cases, the number addressing lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (“LGBT”) issues is minuscule.  In fact, there have been 
only five published cases involving LGBT asylum claims: four circuit court 
cases and one Board of Immigration Appeals (B.I.A.) decision.8  Moreover, 
only two of these five cases addresse a claim for asylum by a transgender 
applicant, and then only indirectly.9
 
Equality, I have worked directly with several successful transgender applicants and provided 
technical assistance to other attorneys in such claims. 
  This Article will discuss existing 
precedent in the context of transgender asylum seekers, suggesting ways 
that the case law could be used to frame a successful transgender asylum 
claim. 
 7. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“B.I.A.”) is the administrative appellate body 
that hears appeals from the Immigration Court.  When the B.I.A. publishes cases, the 
decisions become binding precedent for subsequent Immigration Court decisions.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(g) (2005).  The Federal Circuit Court then has power to review final orders of 
removal.  Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 242(a)-(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)-(d) 
(2004).  The B.I.A. did not assign precedential value to a decision granting asylum until 
1987.  See Robert C. Leitner, A Flawed System Exposed: The Immigration Adjudicatory 
System and Asylum for Sexual Minorities, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 679, 696 (2004) (citing 
Deborah Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on the 
Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 447 n.46 (1992)).  While there had been successful asylum 
claims before that, the B.I.A. had chosen not to designate them as precedent.  Each year the 
B.I.A. publishes approximately fifty of its decisions (the majority of which do not concern 
asylum) out of the roughly 4000 cases that it hears.  Id. at 696 and accompanying footnotes 
(citing T. David Parish, Membership in a Particular Social Group Under the Refugee Act of 
1980: Social Identity and the Legal Concept of the Refugee, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 950 
n.152 (1992)). 
 8. Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2004); Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 
F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 2003); Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997); Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. 
Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990).  The Attorney General designated Toboso-Alfonso as precedent for 
all proceedings involving the same issues.  1895 Op. Att’y Gen. 94 (1994) (on file with  
author). 
 9. See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1084.  As discussed infra at Part II.B., the 
Hernandez-Montiel asylum seeker probably actually identifies as transgender, but the court 
classifies him as a gay man “with [a] female sexual identit[y].”   Id. at 1087.  As in 
Hernandez-Montiel, Reyes-Reyes also involved an applicant who was probably transgender, 
but whom the Ninth Circuit described as a “homosexual male with a female sexual identity” 
rather than explicitly calling him transgender.  384 F.3d at 785.  In Reyes-Reyes, the Ninth 
Circuit did not reach the merits of the claim, choosing to remand the decision because the 
immigration judge applied the wrong legal standards.  Id. at 784.  Thus, the court did not 
address whether or not transgender identity could comprise a particular social group.  
Because the Reyes-Reyes decision is the topic of another Article in this book, this Article 
does not discuss the Reyes-Reyes case.  For a full discussion of Reyes-Reyes, see Joseph 
Landau, “Soft Immutablity” and “Imputed Gay Identity”:  Recent Developments in 
Transgender and Sexual-Orientation-Based Asylum Law, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. ------,----- 
(2005). 
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Part I of this Article will explain the legal standard for asylum claims.10  
This section will specifically focus on the definition of the “particular 
social group” category of protection within asylum law because this is the 
category under which Geovanni and other transgender applicants would put 
forward their asylum claims.11  Part I also emphasizes the requirement 
under asylum law that a nexus exist between the applicant’s protected 
characteristic and the persecutor’s motivation to harm.12  Establishing such 
a nexus may be a particularly difficult aspect of transgender asylum 
cases.13
Part II will focus directly on Geovanni’s claim.
 
14  It will first argue that 
transgender identity meets the legal definition of “particular social 
group.”15  It will then explore the requirement of proving a nexus between 
the harm Geovanni suffered and her transgender identity.16  Finally, Part II 
will argue that regardless of whether or not a transgender applicant actually 
identifies as homosexual, she should also put forward a claim based on her 
perceived identity as a homosexual if she believes that her persecutors 
thought her to be gay.17
I.  BACKGROUND ON ASYLUM LAW 
 
A foreign national who fears returning to her country because she has 
suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution18 
on account of her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion may apply for asylum in the United 
States.19
 
 10. See infra Part I. 
  If successful, she is granted asylum status, which allows her to 
 11. See infra Parts I.A-B. 
 12. See infra Part I.C. 
 13. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. Infra Part II.A. 
 16. Infra Part II.B. 
 17. Infra Part II.C. 
 18. Although the INA does not define “persecution,” case law has forged a definition for 
this term.  Generally, physical harm including death, torture, and beatings are considered 
persecution, and, under some circumstances, non-physical harm such as severe 
discrimination, economic deprivation, or forced conscription may rise to the level of 
persecution.  Karen Musalo, Ruminations on In re Kasinga: The Decision’s Legacy, 7 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 357, 362-63 (1998) [hereinafter Musalo I].  If the applicant 
has suffered past persecution, there is a presumption that he will also suffer future 
persecution.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2005).  If the persecutor is a non-state actor, the 
applicant must also prove that his government was unable or unwilling to protect him and 
that it would not be possible for him to safely relocate within his country.  Id.  § 
208.13(b)(3)(ii). 
 19. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2005). 
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remain lawfully in the United States, to be accompanied or followed by a 
spouse or children,20 and to petition for authorization to travel21 and 
work.22  A year after her grant of asylum, she can apply for legal 
permanent residence.23
Historically, the term refugee “came of age during the Cold War,” when 
it was most commonly used to refer to political dissidents from Soviet bloc 
countries.
 
24  During the last decade, however, there has been a shift, and 
increasing numbers of foreign nationals are seeking asylum based on less 
traditional groundsas members of “a particular social group.”25  In 1994, 
Attorney General Janet Reno designated a 1990 B.I.A. decision, Matter of 
Toboso-Alfonso, as precedent.26  This case recognized that homosexuality 
could form the basis for membership in a particular social group, allowing 
lesbians and gay men to qualify for asylum if they could demonstrate 
persecution based on their sexual orientation.27  Likewise, the last ten years 
have seen landmark asylum cases recognizing gender-based violence, such 
as female genital mutilation and domestic violence, as potential grounds for 
asylum.28
 
 20. Id.  § 1158(b)(3). 
  Since gender is not one of the five protected categories under 
 21. Id.  § 1158(c)(1)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 223.2. 
 22. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 208.7. 
 23. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(g). 
 24. See Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A 
Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 781 n.28 (2003) 
[hereinafter Musalo II]. 
 25. These less traditional grounds have included individuals fleeing persecution on 
gender-based grounds such as female genital mutilation and domestic violence, as well as 
sexual-orientation based claims.  See infra notes 27-28. 
 26. 1895 Op. Att’y Gen. 94 (1994) (designating that Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & 
N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990), would serve as binding precedent “in all proceedings involving 
the same issue or issues”) (memorandum on file with author). 
 27. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 822 (upholding immigration judge’s finding that 
Toboso-Alfonso established membership in a social group on the basis of his status as a 
homosexual, and noting that the issue of whether homosexuality is an immutable 
characteristic was not raised on appeal); see generally James D. Wilets, Conceptualizing 
Private Violence Against Sexual Minorities as Gendered Violence: An International and 
Comparative Law Perspective, 60 ALB. L. REV. 989 (1997) (comparing the rights of women 
who are abused to the rights of sexual minorities who are abused). 
 28. See Gonzales v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 947 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that 
respondent was granted asylum on the basis of her status as a victim of domestic violence); 
In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996) (characterizing female genital 
mutilation, practiced by the applicant’s tribe, as “persecution”); see also B.J. Chisholm, 
Credible Definitions: A Critique of U.S. Asylum Law’s Treatment of Gender-Related 
Claims, 44 HOW. L.J. 427 (2001) (critiquing existing and proposed legal standards for 
determining the existence of a “social group” under asylum law in the United States); Irena 
Lieberman, Women and Girls Facing Gender-Based Violence, and Asylum Jurisprudence, 
29 HUM. RTS. 9 (2002) (focusing on the unique challenges faced by women and girls 
NEILSONCHRISTENSEN[2] 2/3/2011  10:00 PM 
106 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. XXXII 
asylum law, the gender-based persecution cases also must rely on 
expansive definitions of the “particular social group” category. 
 A.  Defining Particular Social Group 
The phrase “membership in a particular social group” is not defined in 
the Immigration and Nationality Act.29  Case law has offered guidance, 
however, in fashioning a definition.  In Matter of Acosta, the B.I.A. 
determined that the characteristic that defines the group “must be one that 
the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required 
to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or 
consciences.”30  In Acosta, the B.I.A. held that the applicant, a Salvadoran 
taxi driver who was opposed to work stoppages, and thus targeted for harm 
by guerillas, did not fall within this definition.31  The Board found that 
since Acosta was free to change his occupation, and that taxi driving was 
not fundamental to his identity, the proposed social group to which he 
claimed membership did not warrant a grant of asylum.32
Following the Acosta decision, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of 
membership in a particular social group in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS.
 
33  In 
Sanchez-Trujillo, the applicants proposed a particular social group of 
“young, urban, working-class males of military age” in El Salvador who 
faced potential persecution because they did not actively support the 
government by serving in the military.34  The Ninth Circuit rejected this 
formulation of a “particular social group,” and promulgated its own 
definition, adding a “voluntary associational relationship” requirement 
among group members, which the proposed group did not meet.35
 
seeking asylum protection from gender-based violence); Musalo I, supra note 18, at 357 et 
seq. (reflecting on the impact of Fauziya Kasinga’s highly politicized asylum case on 
relevant law and policy). 
  In a 
subsequent case, Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, the Ninth Circuit decided that 
membership in a particular social group could entail either voluntary 
relationships or an “innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the 
 29. See INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2004); see also Melanie 
Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against Women: A 
Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based on 
Gender Persecution, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 281 (2002) (describing “membership in a 
particular social group” as the “most elastic and nebulous” category of asylum claims). 
 30. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 31. Id. at 234 (noting that one’s profession is not an immutable characteristic). 
 32. Id. (finding that Acosta could have changed jobs or cooperated with guerillas to free 
himself from the fear of prosecution). 
 33. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 34. Id. at 1577. 
 35. Id. at 1576. 
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identities or consciences of its members that members either cannot or 
should not be required to change it,” bringing it in line with the B.I.A. 
definition.36
In 2001, the Immigration and Naturalization Service proposed 
regulations that would, in part, provide guidance on determining 
membership in a particular group.
 
37  The proposed regulations would 
harmonize existing case law and provide definition to one of the least 
defined areas of asylum law.38
 
 36. 225 F.3d 1084, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that gay men with female sexual 
identities in Mexico comprised a particular social group for purposes of asylum).  The 
significance of the Hernandez-Montiel ruling to transgender applicants is discussed infra at 
Part II.B.  For a further discussion of the evolution of the particular social group category 
see Musalo II, supra note 24, at 783-85. 
  While it remains to be seen when or if the 
 37. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588 (Dec. 7, 2001) (to be 
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).  The regulations were proposed in response to In re R-A-, 22 I. 
& N. Dec. 906, Interim Decision 3403 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (Att’y 
Gen. 2001), in which a Guatemalan woman sought asylum after enduring years of domestic 
violence and being unable to obtain protection from her government.  The Immigration 
Judge had granted asylum to R-A-, but the B.I.A. overturned the decision.  Matter of R-A-, 
22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999).  Former Attorney General Janet Reno vacated the 
decision and remanded it for reconsideration upon the final publication of the proposed rule, 
65 Fed. Reg. 76588 (Dec. 7, 2000).  Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 906 (Att’y Gen. 
2001).  The regulations have still not been finalized and Matter of R-A- is still pending.  See 
Musalo II, supra note 24, at 802-03 (discussing Matter of R-A-); Asylum Protection News 
14, Human Rights First (Human Rights First, New York, N.Y.), May 7, 2003, available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/torchlight/newsletter/newslet_14.htm (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2005).  
 38. See 65 Fed. Reg. 76588.  The proposed regulations set forth the following definition 
for membership in a particular social group: 
Proposed § 208.15 Definitions. . . .  
(c) Membership in a particular social group. 
(1) A particular social group is composed of members who share a common, 
immutable characteristic, such as sex, color, kinship ties, or past experience, that a 
member either cannot change or that is so fundamental to the identity or 
conscience of the member that he or she should not be required to change it.  The 
group must exist independently of the fact of persecution.  In determining whether 
an applicant cannot change, or should not be expected to change, the shared 
characteristic, all relevant evidence should be considered, including the 
applicant’s individual circumstances and country conditions information about the 
applicant’s society. 
(2) When past experience defines a particular social group, the past experience 
must be an experience that, at the time it occurred, the member either could not 
have changed or was so fundamental to his or her identity or conscience that he or 
she should not have been required to change it. 
(3) Factors that may be considered in addition to the required factors set forth in 
paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section, but are not necessarily determinative, in 
deciding whether a particular social group exists include whether: 
(i) The members of the group are closely affiliated with each other; 
(ii) The members are driven by a common motive or interest; 
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regulations will be finalized,39 because former Attorney General Ashcroft’s 
commentary to the proposed regulations states that they do not change the 
law but rather codify “existing administrative interpretation,”40 the 
proposed regulations have guided decisions by federal courts in subsequent 
asylum cases.41
 B.  Sexual Orientation as Membership in a Particular Social Group 
   
In the Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, the B.I.A. held that sexual orientation 
could be a basis for membership in a particular social group.42  Toboso-
Alfonso was a gay Cuban man who had suffered repeated abuse by his 
government because of his homosexuality.43  He was detained by police on 
several occasions, disproportionately sentenced to sixty days of hard labor 
for missing work, and forced to appear for a “hearing” with the government 
every two to three months, all because of his sexual orientation.44  The 
immigration court granted Toboso-Alfonso withholding of deportation, 
which is a form of relief similar to asylum.45
 
(iii) A voluntary associational relationship exists among the members; 
  The Immigration and 
(iv) The group is recognized to be a societal faction or is otherwise a 
recognized segment of the population in the country in question; 
(v) Members view themselves as members of the group; and 
(vi) The society in which the group exists distinguishes members of the 
group for different treatment or status than is accorded to other members of 
the society.   
Id. 
 39. See Rachel Swarns, Ashcroft Weighs Granting Political Asylum to Abused Women, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at A1; see also supra note 37. 
 40. See Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 729 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 41. See Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004) (following INS 
proposed regulation in Torture Convention case); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 
548 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that the B.I.A. was beginning to consider external perceptions 
relevant in determining whether a social group existed); Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 729 (noting 
that, when interpreting the INA, the opinions of the Attorney General are controlling on 
questions of law) (quoting INA § 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2004)). 
 42. 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990); 1895 Op. Att’y Gen. 94 (1994) (designating 
Toboso-Alfonso as precedent) (memorandum on file with author). 
 43. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 820. 
 44. Id. at 820-21. 
 45. Id. at 823.  As with asylum, to win “withholding” the applicant must prove 
persecution on account of one of the five protected grounds, but unlike asylum the applicant 
is not required to merit a favorable exercise of discretion.  Withholding is a mandatory form 
of relief, with a higher standard of proof than that for asylum.  INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3).  Where an asylum applicant must demonstrate that he has a well-founded fear of 
future persecution, a withholding applicant must demonstrate that it is more likely than not 
that he would face future persecution if returned to his home country.  Id.  Toboso-Alfonso 
had a criminal conviction, which led the judge to deny asylum.  The immigration judge 
recognized, however, that Toboso-Alfonso was likely to face persecution if returned to 
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Naturalization Service (“INS”) appealed the decision to the B.I.A., arguing 
that granting Toboso-Alfonso immigration status in the United States based 
on his homosexuality “‘would be tantamount to awarding discretionary 
relief to those involved in behavior that is not only socially deviant in 
nature, but in violation of the laws or regulations of the country as well.’”46  
The B.I.A. found, however, that Toboso-Alfonso was targeted by the 
Cuban government for his “status”47 as a homosexual and not for any 
homosexual conduct.48  The B.I.A. accepted the immigration judge’s 
finding that homosexuality is “immutable” because the INS did not 
challenge it on appeal.49  As a result of this decision, homosexuality was 
unequivocally recognized as a “social group” for asylum purposes and 
thousands of gay men and lesbians have been able to seek asylum in the 
United States based on persecution they suffered on account of their sexual 
orientation.50
Unlike sexual orientation claims, there has yet to be a precedential 
decision establishing transgender individuals as members of a particular 
social group.  The inclusion of sexual orientation as a viable particular 
social group has opened the door to the possibility for other sexual 
minorities to fit within this category.
 
51  In fact, there have been successful 
asylum claims based on transgender, but none have been published as 
precedent.52
 
Cuba, so he granted withholding despite Toboso-Alfonso’s criminal record, a decision 
which was affirmed by the B.I.A.  Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 822. 
 
 46. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 822. 
 47. The difference between “status” and “conduct” is significant in transgender asylum 
claims as well.  As discussed in Part II.B infra, the B.I.A. had denied the asylum application 
of Hernandez-Montiel in large part because it felt that his “conduct” of dressing like a 
woman was not immutable.  See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 48. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 822.  Prior to the decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003), which found a Texas law criminalizing consensual sodomy to be 
unconstitutional, it was difficult to argue that homosexuals should be granted asylum in the 
United States if they faced criminal prosecution for homosexual acts in their home countries 
because such laws had been upheld as constitutional in the United States.  The Lawrence 
decision removes this argument against sexual orientation-based asylum grants.  See id. at 
583 (“Texas’ sodomy law is targeted at . . . gay persons as a class.”). 
 49. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 822. 
 50. During a panel presentation in 2000, presenter Lavi Soloway, previous chair of the 
Board of Directors of the Lesbian and Gay Immigration Rights Task Force (now known as 
Immigration Equality), estimated that, since 1994, 2000 sexual orientation-based asylum 
claims had been filed.  Symposium, Recent Developments in International Law, 26 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 169, 187-88 (2000-2001). 
 51. See, e.g., Mohyuddin, supra note 6, at 405-10 (detailing the accounts of several 
successful asylum claims based on transgender identity which have not been published as 
precedent). 
 52. See id. 
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C.  Proving a “Nexus” to Harm 
Once an asylum applicant has succeeded in establishing that she fits 
within one of the five protected categories, and that she has suffered 
persecution or may suffer persecution in the future, she must also 
demonstrate that the persecution is “on account of” the protected 
category.53  In a 1992 decision, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, the United States 
Supreme Court addressed the necessity of proving a nexus between the 
harm suffered and the protected characteristic.54  The Court held that Elias-
Zacarias, a Guatemalan man who resisted recruitment by guerilla rebels 
and feared that they would kill him as a result, had not demonstrated that 
his fear was “on account of” his political opinion.55  Instead, the Court 
found that, although the rebel violence might ultimately be politically 
motivated, the guerillas were recruiting Elias-Zacarias because they needed 
to increase their troops.56  Elias-Zacarias thus failed to establish that he was 
targeted for potential violence on account of any political opinion (or lack 
thereof) that he held.57
As a result of the Elias-Zacarias decision, adjudicators have added 
another level of scrutiny to asylum cases by requiring a level of causation 
based on the persecutor’s intent.  Now, the courts analyze the intent of the 
persecutor to ensure that the protected characteristic motivates the 
persecutor to harm the applicant.
   
58
 
 53. INA § 101(a)(42)(A) (2000); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000). 
  In other words, it is not sufficient to 
demonstrate that the applicant falls within one of the protected categories 
and that she has suffered past persecution or will suffer future persecution, 
 54. 502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
 55. Id. at 482-83. 
 56. Id. at 482 (interpreting the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the guerillas’ “motive in 
carrying out the kidnapping [was] political” to mean that the guerillas sought to create an 
army to wage war against the government) (quoting Elias-Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 
850 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 57. See id. (stating that the mere existence of a generalized political motive underlying 
the guerillas’ forced recruitment did not establish that Elias-Zacarias feared persecution on 
account of his own political opinions).  As Justice Scalia explains in the majority opinion of 
Elias-Zacarias,  
[i]f a Nazi regime persecutes Jews, it is not, within the ordinary meaning of 
language, engaging in persecution on account of political opinion; and if a 
fundamentalist Moslem regime persecutes democrats, it is not engaging in 
persecution on account of religion.  Thus, the mere existence of a generalized 
“political” motive underlying the guerrillas’ forced recruitment is inadequate to 
establish (and, indeed, goes far to refute) the proposition that Elias-Zacarias fears 
persecution on account of political opinion, as § 101(a)(42) requires.  
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 58. See Shayna S. Cook, Repairing the Legacy of INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 23 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 223, 224 (2002).   
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she must also affirmatively demonstrate that a primary reason for the 
persecution is her protected characteristic.59
As discussed below, proving the nexus between the persecutor’s 
motivation and the protected characteristic may be particularly difficult in 
transgender cases.
 
60  Consider an asylum applicant who is anatomically 
male, dresses like a woman, and has romantic relationships with men.  It 
may not be possible for the applicant (or the adjudicator) to determine 
whether she has been harmed because the persecutor perceives her to be a 
homosexual man or because she appears to be a man wearing women’s 
clothes.  Regardless of whether she is harmed as a transgender individual or 
as an actual or perceived homosexual, she should qualify for asylum.61  
The applicant should be prepared, however, to grapple with unresolved 
issues within the universe of asylum law and to put forth alternative 
theories of her case.62
II.  TRANSGENDER CLAIMS UNDER ASYLUM LAW 
 
Having considered the relevant issues pertaining to asylum cases 
generally, this Article now turns specifically to the possibility of Geovanni 
making a successful claim for asylum.  There is no precedent directly 
addressing asylum based solely on transgender identity.63  The primary 
issues Geovanni will have to address are whether, based on her transgender 
identity, she can successfully claim membership in a particular social 
group, and, if so, whether she will be able to establish that the harm she 
suffered was “on account of” her transgender identity.64
 
 59. See id.  (describing the requirement that an asylum applicant provide some evidence 
that the persecutor’s motivation for the persecution was the applicant’s race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group).  It is worth noting 
that in Pitcherskaia v. INS, the only precedent addressing a lesbian asylum claim, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the B.I.A.’s holding that because the persecutors’ intent was “benign”––the 
alleged persecutors claimed they subjected the applicant to enforced psychiatric treatment 
out of a desire to “cure” her of her homosexuality––their actions did not constitute 
persecution.  118 F.3d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1997).  The Ninth Circuit noted that the motive of 
the persecutor is relevant “only insofar as the alien must establish that the persecution is 
inflicted . . . ‘on account of’ a characteristic or perceived characteristic of the alien.”  Id. at 
647.  Thus, Pitcherskaia clarified that an asylum applicant is not required to show that the 
persecutor’s intent was malicious so long as the persecutor’s actions were, in fact, motivated 
by the victim’s protected characteristic.  See id. at 647. 
  This may be very 
difficult to demonstrate, so Geovanni’s claim may be strongest if she also 
 60. See infra Part II. 
 61. See infra Conclusion. 
 62. See infra Conclusion. 
 63. See supra notes 8-9, 52. 
 64. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
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puts forth a claim of “imputed” membership in the firmly established 
“particular social group” of homosexuals.65
  A. Particular Social Group and Transgender Applicants 
 
The first step in preparing a successful claim for Geovanni is 
demonstrating that transgender individuals comprise a particular social 
group.  As discussed above, persecution based on sexual orientation has 
unequivocally been found to be a ground for asylum.66  While being 
transgender is often confused with sexual orientation, the two are distinct.67  
Sexual orientation is generally defined as the emotional and sexual 
attraction an individual feels towards others.68
First, Geovanni may have difficulties proving to an adjudicator that her 
transgender identity is “immutable” since a primary component of that 
identity is her desire to change the anatomical sex with which she was 
born.
  The first question, then, is 
whether Geovanni could successfully put forward a successful application 
based on transgender identity alone, without including sexual orientation in 
the claim. 
69  While most non-transgender individuals (including, one imagines, 
the vast majority of asylum adjudicators) consider their sex and gender to 
be immutable, most transgender individuals do not.70
 
 65. See infra Part II.A-C. 
  Nevertheless, the 
debate surrounding the rigidity of gender and sex should not preclude a 
 66. See supra notes 25-28, 50 and accompanying text. 
 67. While medical researchers once assumed that transsexuals are generally 
heterosexual, there is growing evidence to show that there are greater incidences of 
homosexuality and bisexuality among transsexual individuals.  Shannon Minter, Do 
Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights? Getting Real about Transgender Inclusion in the Gay 
Rights Movement, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 589, 591 n.13 and accompanying text, 609 et 
seq. (2000) (citation omitted). 
 68. See Suzanne Goldberg, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death: Political Asylum and 
the Global Persecution of Lesbians and Gay Men, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 605, 605 n.1 
(1993) (positing the following definitions: “a) sexual orientation: an enduring erotic, 
emotional, or romantic attraction to individuals of a particular gender; b) homosexual: a 
primary or exclusive attraction to individuals of one’s own gender; c) heterosexual: a 
primary or exclusive attraction to individuals of the other gender”). 
 69. See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 1, at 238 n.1 (defining transgender individuals as 
those “who desire to change their gender, are in the process of changing their gender, or 
have completed the process of changing their gender”). 
 70. Although transgender individuals may believe that their anatomical sex can and 
should be changed, this does not necessarily mean that they feel that their gender is not 
immutable.  Thus, one could argue that a transgender applicant’s gender is immutable, just 
as a woman seeking asylum on the basis of mistreatment as a female would argue that her 
gender is immutable.  See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365-66 (B.I.A. 1996) 
(granting the request of a young woman seeking asylum from her home country to avoid 
female genital mutilation because being female is an immutable characteristic). 
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finding that transgender identity can form the basis of membership in a 
particular social group.71  Social group membership can also be based on 
past experience among individuals who share a characteristic that is 
fundamental to identity.72
Secondly, transgender individuals meet at least some of the additional 
guidelines set forth in the proposed regulations.
  Thus, the relevant social group could be framed 
as “individuals born with one anatomical sex who believe their anatomical 
sex does not match their gender.”  Since there is scarcely any characteristic 
more fundamental to identity than a person’s gender, this would be a strong 
argument. 
73  For example, they may 
affiliate closely with one another and voluntarily associate with one 
another.74  In addition, transgender men and women are driven by their 
common interest in assuming the gender identity of the opposite sex;75 they 
view themselves as members of the group of transgender individuals;76 and 
they are recognized as a segment of the population and are singled out for 
different treatment.77  Since gender identity itself, if not its anatomical 
manifestation, is immutable and fundamental to a person’s identity,78
 B.  The Nexus Between Transgender Identity and Persecution 
 
transgender individuals should be able to establish that they are members of 
a particular social group for asylum purposes. 
Once a transgender claimant has established that her transgender identity 
qualifies as membership in a particular social group, she will have another 
hurdle to clear.  As discussed above, INS v. Elias-Zacarias requires an 
asylum seeker to prove a nexus between the attacker’s actions and the 
 
 71. There is some risk that courts might find that the desire to change one’s gender 
identity is not protected.  For example, Currah and Minter describe how courts have inferred 
a distinction between discrimination based on sex and discrimination based on a change of 
sex.  Currah & Minter, supra note 1, at 40.  In arguing the irrationality of this distinction, 
Currah and Minter analogize that a court is not likely to find that an employer who fired an 
employee for changing his religious affiliation or nationality would be excused because he 
objected to the change rather than to the new religion or nationality.  Id. at 41. 
 72. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 73. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining that, in the wake of In re R-A-, 
then Attorney General Janet Reno proposed amendments to the I.N.S. regulations that 
govern establishing asylum and withholding eligibility). 
 74.  Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, § 208.15(c)(3)(i), (iii) 
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
 75. Id. at § 208.15(c)(3)(ii). 
 76. Id. at § 208.15(c)(3)(v). 
 77. Id. at § 208.15(c)(3)(iv), (vi). 
 78. See, e.g., Musalo I, supra note 18, at 366 (noting that the board in Matter of Acosta 
defined gender as an immutable characteristic). 
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protected characteristic.79
Perhaps this very issue was at the heart of the framing of the social 
group in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS.
  It is certainly possible that an applicant who 
successfully establishes that she is transgender, and thus meets the 
definition for membership in a particular social group, could still lose her 
asylum case because she cannot establish that her attacker knew that she 
was transgender. 
80  In Hernandez-Montiel, the Ninth 
Circuit took up the question of whether or not “gay men with female sexual 
identities in Mexico” constitute a protected ‘“particular social group.’”81  
At first glance, it is hard to imagine why Hernandez-Montiel’s counsel 
would have chosen to frame the particular social group in the way that they 
did.  At the time, sexual orientation had already been recognized by the 
B.I.A. as a particular social group,82
The answer probably lies in the “nexus” requirement between the 
protected category and the harm.  It is likely that Hernandez-Montiel could 
not prove to what extent the harm he suffered was because he was gay and 
to what extent the harm was derived from his female appearance.
 so why narrow the category to gay 
men with female sexual identities? 
83  Thus, 
although the framing of the social group category appears to be merely 
narrowing the established sexual orientation social group,84
Indeed, while the immigration judge and the B.I.A. probably understood 
that they were required by the precedent set in Matter of Toboso-Alfonso to 
recognize sexual orientation as a particular social group, neither was 
prepared to do so for men who dress like women.
 it is actually 
expanding the categories of harm that will qualify as persecution against 




 79. See 502 U.S. 478 (1992); see also supra Part I.C (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Elias-Zacarias). 
  The immigration judge 
found it significant that Hernandez-Montiel did not always dress like a 
 80. 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 81. Id. at 1087. 
 82. See supra Part I.B. 
 83. I am using the male pronoun “he” to describe Geovanni Hernandez-Montiel when 
discussing the Ninth Circuit’s decision because that is the pronoun the court and Hernandez-
Montiel’s amicus brief use.  See supra note 2. 
 84. Although gay men had already been established as a particular social group, the 
B.I.A. and courts have always been reluctant to recognize social groups that are overbroad.  
See Chisholm, supra note 28, at 441 (discussing the “floodgates” argument against 
expanding asylum categories too broadly). 
 85. See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1089-90 (summarizing the holdings of the 
immigration judge and the B.I.A.). 
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woman.86  Since Hernandez-Montiel chose to sometimes dress like a man, 
the immigration judge determined that his appearance was volitional and 
not immutable.87
Likewise, the B.I.A. dismissed Hernandez-Montiel’s appeal finding that 
“the tenor of [the applicant’s] claim is that he was “mistreated because of 
the way he dressed (as a male prostitute) and not because he is a 
homosexual.”
 
88  The B.I.A. also found that Hernandez-Montiel failed to 
show that his “decision to dress as a female was an immutable 
characteristic.”89  That is, rather than seeing Hernandez-Montiel’s attire as 
a manifestation of his immutable identity, the B.I.A. saw his manner of 
dress as a voluntary act and something that he could be required to change 
to avoid further abuse.90
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the case differently.  The court reasoned that, 
“Geovanni’s female sexual identity must be fundamental, or he would not 
have suffered this persecution and would have changed years ago.”
 
91  The 
court conflated his “female sexual identity” with his sexual orientation in 
concluding that “[t]his case is about sexual identity, not fashion. . . . .   
Geovanni manifests his sexual orientation by adopting gendered traits 
characteristically associated with women.”92  In classifying Hernandez-
Montiel’s female appearance as a manifestation of his sexual orientation, it 
no longer mattered whether he was persecuted because he was gay or 
because he dressed as a woman.93
 
 86. Id. at 1089. 
  By placing both characteristics under 
the established sexual orientation ground for asylum, the court was able to 
offer Hernandez-Montiel relief based on his suffering for either or both 
 87. Id.  Of course, the immigration judge did not address the possibility that after years 
of being ridiculed, beaten, and raped, at least in part because of his appearance, Hernandez-
Montiel might feel too unsafe to always dress in his preferred manner.  It would be difficult 
to imagine an immigration judge applying the same line of reasoning to an asylum claim 
based on religion.  It seems inconceivable that a Jewish applicant would lose his claim 
because he felt too afraid to wear a yarmulke in public or that a Sikh’s religious identity 
would be questioned for fearing to wear his turban at all times. 
 88. Id.  Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit found no support on the record for the finding 
that Hernandez-Montiel dressed like a male prostitute.  Id. at 1095.  Apparently, this was an 
independent conclusion of the B.I.A.  See id. (“We do not venture to guess the non-record 
basis of the B.I.A.’s assumption of how a male prostitute dresses.”). 
 89. Id. at 1090. 
 90. Id. at 1089-90. 
 91. Id. at 1095 (citing Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 92. Id. at 1096.  For an interesting discussion suggesting how the court’s analysis in 
Hernandez-Montiel could be used to advance transgender litigants’ discrimination claims 
under U.S. law, see Flynn, supra note 1, at 405-08. 
 93. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. 
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aspects of his identity.94
Reading (not very hard) between the lines of the Hernandez-Montiel 
decision, it is apparent that the applicant was a transgender individual.  The 
court writes that Hernandez-Montiel began to dress as a female at age 
twelve,
 
95 and that he had long hair, long nails, and took female hormones.96  
The court tucked its discussion of transsexualism into a footnote.97  In 
footnote 7, the court wrote, “[i]n addition to being a gay man with a female 
sexual identity, Geovanni’s brief states that he ‘may be considered a 
transsexual.’”98  The court then defined transsexualism in the footnote, but 
concluded, “[w]e need not consider in this case whether transsexuals 
constitute a particular social group.”99  Since the court had already found 
that Hernandez-Montiel fit within the social group of “gay men with female 
sexual identities,” it did not need to reach the issue of whether 
transsexuality would constitute a social group, but neither did it discount 
the possibility.100
Hernandez-Montiel is an important bridge to other cases involving 
claims by individuals who push the boundaries of sexual identity.  
Hernandez-Montiel’s case was made somewhat easier by the fact that he 
identified as a gay man.  Many transgender individuals do not self-identify 
 
 
 94. See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1095-96. 
 95. Id. at 1095. 
 96. Id. at 1088 (noting that, when Hernandez-Montiel was placed in a counseling 
program at the age of fifteen, the program staff forced him to cut his hair and nails and to 
stop taking female hormones). 
 97. Id. at 1095 n.7. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  In the footnote, the Ninth Circuit defines a transsexual as  
“a person who is genetically and physically a member of one sex but has a deep-
seated psychological conviction that he or she belongs, or ought to belong, to the 
opposite sex, a conviction which may in some cases result in the individual’s 
decision to undergo surgery in order to physically modify his or her sex organs to 
resemble those of the opposite sex.”  
Id. (quoting Deborah Tussey, Transvestism or Transsexualism of Spouse as Justifying 
Divorce, 82 A.L.R.3d n.2 (2000)). 
 100. Id. at 1087 (finding that Hernandez-Montiel’s female sexual identity is immutable 
because it is inherent to his identity).  An argument could also be made for asylum for 
applicants who are, in a more general sense, gender non-conformists.  For example, in In re 
S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1329 (B.I.A. 2000), asylum was granted to a Moroccan woman 
who refused to follow the narrow religious edicts set down by her father and suffered severe 
beatings as a result.  Further, because she fled to the United States without the “approval or 
supervision of a male family member,” she would have been killed by her father had she 
returned to Morocco.  Id. at 1331.  Such gender-nonconformity based arguments are beyond 
the scope of this article.  For more on the issue of granting asylum for gender persecution, 
see generally Lieberman, supra note 28; and Musalo I, supra note 18. 
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as homosexual,101 however, and therefore would not feel comfortable 
defining their social group as “same sex sexual orientation with opposite 
sex sexual identities” as Hernandez-Montiel did.102
There is only one immigration decision with precedential value that 
deals directly with an application for relief by a transgender individual.
  The question remains 
open then as to how an adjudicator would decide a case in which the 
applicant’s claim is based solely upon transgender identity. 
103  
Miranda v. INS104 was decided prior to Hernandez-Montiel,105 and 
involved an appeal to the Eighth Circuit of the B.I.A.’s denial of the 
applicant’s motion to re-open her106 deportation proceedings to allow her to 
file for suspension of deportation.107
Suspension of deportation was a form of relief, available prior to April 1, 





 101. See Minter, supra note 67, 592-93 n.13 (discussing the distinction between 
transgender individuals and homosexuals). 
  Under the former suspension law, certain foreign nationals could 
obtain legal permanent residence in the United States if they could 
demonstrate: seven years of continuous physical presence in the United 
States; good moral character; and that the applicant or a close family 
member who was a United States citizen or legal permanent resident would 
 102. In fact, putting forward a claim based on homosexual sexual orientation for a person 
who does not actually consider himself or herself to be homosexual could be considered a 
“frivolous” asylum claim.  A “frivolous” asylum claim is defined as an application in which 
“any of its material elements is deliberately fabricated.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.20 (2005).  There is 
no penalty in the INA greater than that for filing a “frivolous” asylum claiman applicant 
found to have knowingly filed a “frivolous” asylum claim after being given notice of the 
consequences of doing so is barred from ever receiving any form of immigration relief in 
the future.  INA § 208(d)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2004); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.3(c)(5), 208.20. 
 103. See generally Miranda v. INS, 51 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming the district 
court’s decision that the potential medical and social hardships the plaintiff might encounter 
if deported did not rise to the level of extreme hardship). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See generally 225 F.3d at 1084.  It is interesting to note that, despite the factual 
similarities, the Miranda decision was not cited in the Hernandez-Montiel decision. 
 106. Miranda v. INS, 51 F.3d at 768-69.  In this case, the court accepts that Miranda is a 
male to female transsexual and refers to her using the female pronoun throughout the 
decision.     
 107. Miranda had already lost her claim for asylum, but it is not possible to tell from the 
decision whether she had applied for asylum based on her sexual identity or for another 
reason.  Since this case was decided in 1993 (after Matter of Toboso-Alfonso was decided, 
but before it was designated as precedent), there was not yet any established precedent that 
sexual orientation could be a ground for asylum.  See id. at 768 (denying applicant’s motion 
because she failed to make a prima facie case for extreme hardship, which was a 
prerequisite to reopen the case). 
 108. IRA KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 688 (8th ed. 2002) 
(stating that suspension of deportation was eliminated as of April 1. 1997). 
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suffer extreme hardship if the applicant was deported.109  Since there was 
neither a requirement to show government involvement or failure to 
protect, nor a requirement to show that the hardship would be “on account 
of” any protected characteristic, suspension was generally easier to win 
than asylum.110  Because of the procedural posture of the appeal in 
Miranda, the circuit court was considering only whether to uphold the 
B.I.A.’s decision not to reopen the case.111  To prevail, Miranda would 
have had to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for suspension.112
Gina Miranda was a male to female, post-operative transsexual from 
Honduras.
 
113  Miranda made two hardship-based arguments.  First she 
stated that she would face medical hardship if forced to return to Honduras 
because there was no “integrated” treatment available for transgender 
people there.114  She submitted letters from two American and two 
Honduran doctors attesting to this assertion.115  Both the B.I.A. and the 
Eighth Circuit rejected this argument, however, finding that the Honduran 
letters were written before Miranda had completed sex reassignment 
surgery, and that there was no evidence that Miranda could not continue to 
receive hormone treatment or counseling if returned to Honduras.116
Miranda next asserted “social hardship.”
 
117  This is the part of Miranda’s 
claim that most closely parallels asylum.  Here, Miranda stated that she 
would “face discrimination and governmental persecution in Honduras and 
[could] not legally change her name and gender” there, which would result 
in extreme hardship to her.118
 
 109. Id. at 710-11 (citing former INA § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (repealed Sept. 
30, 1996)). 
  The B.I.A. rejected this claim, however, 
finding that although Miranda would “face some social difficulties in 
Honduras as a result of her sexual reassignment surgery,” she had not 
 110. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (repealed Sept. 30, 1996). 
 111. See 51 F.3d at 768 (finding that the petitioner did not make a prima facie showing of 
extreme hardship). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 769. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  It is interesting to contrast this reasoning with that of the B.I.A. in Hernandez-
Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).  In Hernandez-Montiel, the B.I.A. denied the 
applicant’s claim, in part, because his female appearance was not permanent: he could 
choose whether or not to wear feminine attire.  Thus, in Hernandez-Montiel, the B.I.A. 
denied the claim, in part, because the applicant could change at will from a male to a female 
appearance and vice versa.  In Miranda, the court found that since her transition to female 
was complete, she no longer faced any medical hardship in returning to Honduras.  Thus, in 
Miranda, the court held the fact that Miranda’s transition was completed against her. 
 117. Miranda, 51 F.3d at 769. 
 118. See id. 
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demonstrated that the problems would rise to the level of extreme 
hardship.119  The B.I.A. found it significant that Miranda had lived part of 
her life in Honduras as a woman before coming to the United States.120  It 
also dismissed Miranda’s claimed discrimination at work because she had 
been able to maintain employment in Honduras and one of her co-workers 
defended her in the face of discrimination.121  The Eighth Circuit upheld 
the B.I.A.’s reasoning, agreeing that Miranda had not made a showing of 
extreme hardship, which the B.I.A. was free to construe narrowly.122
In her case, Miranda had filed a motion to reopen to file the suspension 
claim, which meant that she did not have the opportunity to have a full 
hearing.
 
123  This probably made the record before the court minimal at 
best.124  Nevertheless, when compared with subsequent cases, it is difficult 
to understand why the court refused to reopen Miranda’s case, thereby 
preventing her from submitting her suspension of deportation claim for a 
full hearing.  Following Miranda’s case, there have been successful sexual 
orientation-based asylum cases involving applicants from Honduras,125 and 
Amnesty International reports that transgender individuals in Honduras 
continue to suffer persecution and even death.126  Fortunately, the potential 
precedential damage of the Miranda case was mitigated by the fact that the 
decision is based upon a form of relief that is no longer available under the 
INA.127  In fact, Miranda has only been cited in two subsequent cases, both 
of which were suspension of deportation cases and neither of which dealt 
with a transgender applicant.128
 
 119. Id. 
  Thus, its effects on subsequent cases have 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 769. 
 123. See id. at 768. 
 124. See, e.g., Chungong v. INS, 217 F.3d 836 (4th Cir. 2000) (dispensing with oral 
argument in affirming denial of motion to reopen).  In cases reviewing denials of motions to 
reopen deportation hearings, review is minimal, usually consisting of a review of the file 
and perhaps an allowance for reargument. 
 125. See New Filing Deadline is Tested in Immigration Court: Judge Grants Asylum to 
HIV+ Gay Honduran Man, LGIRTF STATUS REP. ( The Lesbian and Gay Immigr. Rts. Task 
Force, New York, N.Y.), Fall 1998 (on file with author). 
 126. See Amnesty Int’l, Human Rights and Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,” 
(Mar. 31, 2004), at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGACT790012004?open&of=ENG-347 (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2005). 
 127. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254 (repealed 1996). 
 128. See Vallejos-Miranda v. INS., 133 F.3d 923, 923 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Miranda as 
support for the B.I.A.’s denial of a relief to petitioner); Oyelowo v. INS, 74 F.3d 1243, 1243 
(8th Cir. 1996) (citing Miranda as enumerating a rule allowing B.I.A. to narrowly define 
“extreme hardship”). 
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been minimal. 
 C.  Framing Transgender Claims as “Imputed Sexual Orientation” 
Claims 
If it is not possible to convince an adjudicator that transgender 
individuals constitute a particular social group, or that the applicant was 
persecuted because she was transgender, it might be logical to use the 
Hernandez-Montiel approach of framing transgender identity as a 
component of the applicant’s sexual orientation.  For many transgender 
individuals, however, this approach will not work because the applicant 
may not consider herself to be gay.129
In the new fact pattern, Geovanni refuses to identify as a “gay man with 
a female sexual identity,” because she does not consider herself 
homosexual or a man.  Although she had relationships with men in Mexico 
while she was still anatomically male, she considered herself to be a 
woman in heterosexual relationships.  In these altered facts, Geovanni’s 
longest term partner never considered himself to be gay either, and 
Geovanni was the only “man” with whom he had ever been involved.
  Let us consider how to frame 
Geovanni’s claim if the facts of the Hernandez-Montiel case were slightly 
different. 
130
One way to approach this factual scenario would be to argue that, 
regardless of whether or not Geovanni self-identifies as homosexual, much 
of the abuse she suffered in her country was a result of others perceiving 
her to be homosexual.  After all, while living in her country, Geovanni was 
anatomically male and had romantic relationships with men.  The men who 
attacked Geovanni almost always made homophobic comments while they 
abused her.  If the reason for the harm she suffered was the persecutors’ 
belief that Geovanni was a gay male, it seems logical to frame the asylum 
application from the perspective of the persecutors.
 
131
Since Geovanni does not actually consider herself to be homosexual, the 
claim that she would be putting forward under this category is one of 
imputed membership in a particular social group.  While it is clear that 




 129. See supra note 101. 
 it is 
 130. This fact pattern is based loosely on the facts of a transgender asylum case on which 
the author is currently working. 
 131. This is especially true in light of INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992), 
discussed supra at Part I.C., which requires the asylum applicant to ”provide some 
evidence” that the motivation of the persecutor was the applicant’s protected characteristic.  
Id. at 483. 
 132. See supra Part I.B (discussing Matter of Toboso-Alfonso). 
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not clear whether or not adjudicators will recognize imputed sexual 
orientation or imputed membership in any particular social group. 
Although there is substantial precedent establishing that an asylum 
applicant can win a claim based on his imputed political opinion,133 the 
availability of asylum based on imputed membership in a social group is 
less clear.  The only precedential case to address whether or not sexual 
orientation can be imputed is Amanfi v. Ashcroft.134  In Amanfi, the 
applicant, a man from Ghana, was told by men claiming to be police 
officers that his father had been murdered as a result of his religious 
preaching.135  Amanfi was abducted by private security forces hired to 
settle disputes,136 placed in a room with an idol covered with blood, and 
served food and wine.137  Based on the teachings of his grandfather, 
Amanfi concluded that the “macho men” who abducted him were preparing 
him for a ritual sacrifice.138  When another man was placed in the room 
with him, Amanfi convinced the man to engage in a homosexual act with 
him so that the two would be considered unacceptable for sacrifice.139  
When the “macho men” found Amanfi and the other man engaged in the 
homosexual act, they beat them and brought them to the police station.140  
At the police station they were both beaten again and the other man was 
eventually beaten to death.141  After Amanfi escaped from the police 
station, he was forced to stay in a hotel because he could no longer stay 
with family members who now believed him to be gay,142 and he was told 
that the police were looking for him.143  Amanfi was able to escape and 
fled Ghana.144  Amanfi does not identify as gay, but rather testified that he 
engaged in the homosexual act to be spared from human sacrifice.145
Amanfi first argued that he was targeted because of his religious beliefs, 
but the B.I.A. found that the harm he suffered at the hands of the “macho 
men” was based on a private dispute between them and his father, and 
 
 
 133. See, e.g., Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 729 and n.4 (3d Cir. 2003) (listing 
Circuit Court cases affirming imputed political opinion as a ground for asylum). 
 134. 328 F.3d 719. 
 135. Id. at 722. 
 136. These private security forces are referred to as “macho men.”  Id. at 723. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See id. (“Amanfi’s cousin refused to let him stay with her because his reputation as a 
homosexual had drawn ‘a lot of attention.’”). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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therefore was not “on account of” his religious beliefs.146 Amanfi also 
argued that he would be subjected to future persecution because he was 
believed to be homosexual by members of the community and the 
government.147  While the B.I.A. acknowledged that sexual orientation 
could form the basis of  “a particular social group,” it found that since 
Amanfi admitted that he was not a homosexual, he could not fall within the 
“particular social group” of homosexuals.148  The B.I.A. also noted that 
while imputed political opinion has been recognized for asylum purposes, 
no precedent exists for a finding of imputed membership in a particular 
social group in this case.149
Subsequent to Amanfi filing his petition for review, the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”)
 
150 proposed regulations dealing in large part 
with “particular social group” issues.151
An asylum applicant must establish that the persecutor acted, or that there 
is a reasonable possibility that the persecutor would act, against the 
applicant on account of the applicant’s race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or on 
account of what the persecutor perceives to be the applicant’s race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.
  In relevant part, the proposed 
regulations would amend existing regulations to state: 
152
The INS moved the Third Circuit to remand Amanfi to the B.I.A. to 
reconsider the case in light of the proposed regulations.
 
153




 146. Id. at 724. 
 they are not 
binding on the DHS or courts, but the Third Circuit found that it could 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. (citing Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990) (holding 
that an applicant established his membership in the particular social group of homosexuals 
in Cuba because he testified that he was registered as a homosexual with the Cuban 
government and persecuted on account of his sexual orientation)). 
 150. In 2003, the Department of Homeland Security replaced the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service as the agency which adjudicates asylum applications.  See The INS 
No Longer: Immigration and Asylum under the Department of Homeland Security, LGIRTF 
STATUS REP. (The Lesbian and Gay Immigr. Rts. Task Force, New York, N.Y.),  No. 1, 
2003 at 4 (on file with author). 
 151. See supra notes 37-38. 
 152. See supra note 38 (quoting proposed regulations 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b)). 
 153. Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 727-28.  Note that the Third Circuit uses the old agency name, 
I.N.S., in its discussion.  Id. 
 154. See supra note 39. 
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decide this issue of law without remanding the case.155  The court held that 
“persecution ‘on account of’ membership in a social group, as defined in 
INA §§ 101(a)(42)(A) and 241(b)(3), includes what the persecutor 
perceives to be the applicant’s membership in a social group.”156  The court 
then remanded the case to the B.I.A. for a full consideration of the evidence 
in light of Amanfi’s claims to persecution as an imputed member in the 
particular social group of homosexuals.157
The Amanfi decision has enormous significance for transgender 
individuals who have suffered persecution because they are perceived to be 
homosexual.  This decision and, if they are ever promulgated, the proposed 
regulations which the decision interprets, will allow transgender asylum 
applicants to prove their cases without necessarily having to establish that 
the persecutor targeted them because of their transgender identity.  In many 
instances, a transgender applicant will suffer harm because she is believed 
to be homosexual.  In many attacks to which transgender individuals are 
subjected, they hear such epithets for “homosexual” as “faggot” or “dyke.”  
Indeed, many cultures may not even have a word for transgender identity, 
and equivalent epithets may not exist.  Thus, in spite of the inherent 
differences between transgender and homosexual identities, it is important 
under asylum law to recognize the connections between the two. 
 
CONCLUSION 
While navigating the uncharted territory of transgender asylum claims, 
Geovanni should put forth alternative theories for her claim.  First, 
Geovanni should make a claim that her identity as a transgender individual 
qualifies her as a member of a particular social group.158  Gender identity is 
fundamental to human identity, and whether or not Geovanni chooses to 
change the outward manifestations of the appearance of her gender, the 
identity itself is immutable.159  Since there is no precedential decision 
recognizing transgender identity as a particular social group, there would 
be some risk in advancing this as the only ground for asylum.160
 
 155. Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 729.  The court found it significant that the proposed regulations 
did not purport to change the law, but rather to codify existing precedent.  Thus, the court 
did not find any need to remand the case to the B.I.A. for it to interpret the proposed 
regulations.  Id. 
  
Moreover, because the asylum applicant must prove that the persecutor’s 
 156. Id. at 730. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See supra notes 25-27, 29-36, 42-50 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra notes 36, 49 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra note 51-52 and accompanying text. 
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motivation to harm her is the protected characteristic, Geovanni may have 
difficulty establishing that the persecutor actually knew that she had a 
transgender identity, particularly if the persecutor makes homophobic 
statements during the attack.161
Therefore, at the same time that Geovanni puts forth her claim based on 
transgender identity, she should also lean on the jurisprudence that has 
developed in sexual orientation-based asylum claims.  If she happens to 
identify as homosexual, she should apply for asylum based on both sexual 
orientation and gender identity.
 
162  If she does not consider herself 
homosexual, she should still make a claim based on imputed homosexual 
orientation if she believes that this is the reason that her persecutors 
targeted her.163
There is often a perception that the issue of transgender rights is a 
footnote to the civil rights advances of lesbians and gay men.
 
164  In asylum 
law, transgender individuals have an opportunity to advance their cases 
based on jurisprudence that has developed in the area of sexual orientation-
based claims, regardless of whether or not the applicant identifies as 
lesbian or gay.165  There is no question that transgender individuals 
continue to suffer severe discrimination and violence around the world.166
 
  
Although there is no binding precedent in this area, with a properly framed 
case, transgender people who have suffered persecution or who fear future 




 161. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra Part I.B. 
 163. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Amanfi v. Ashcroft decision and its implications 
for transgender asylum applicants).   
 164. See Flynn, supra note 1, at 395.  Flynn argues that rather than seeing transgender 
rights cases at the periphery of homosexual and women’s rights cases, transgender cases 
should be central in the struggle for rights based on gender identity, within which she 
includes both sexual orientation and sex. 
 165. See supra Part I.B and notes 26-27 and accompanying text.   
 166. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Crimes of Hate, Conspiracy of Silence: Torture and Ill-
Treatment Based on Sexual Identity, at 50 (2001), available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/ai.nsf/afec99eadc40eff880256e8f0060197c/dc31f264b72fabf2
80256a48003c810c/$FILE/lgbt.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2005). 
